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Abstract—This research reviews a comprehensive and 
somehow chronological literature in the models and frameworks 
of competition and strategy. Strategic management research is 
shaped around a core question that why some firms outperform 
others; several significant lines of work have emerged in the 
strategic management field since its infancy. These include 
industrial organization, the resource-based view and dynamic 
capabilities. Also, Competition essentially has been the focal point 
of scholars with diverse perspectives such as industrial economics 
and structural analysis, strategic groups, game theory, and 
competitive dynamics. In this research, we represent and 
summarize different perspectives of scholars in framing 
competition and strategy that is related to theory of the firm and 
differential firm performance; also, we show that there is a trend 
from static to dynamic frameworks of strategy and competition 
which have tried to find an answer to differential firm 
performance. Finally, we conclude by addressing the potential for 
utilizing new dynamic and systemic perspectives regarding 
theorizing dynamics of strategy and competition.  
I. INTRODUCTION  
The question “why do some companies exhibit persistent 
superior performance over others” for a long time has been of 
great importance to scholars and practitioners in the business. 
Hence, the field of strategic management is organized around 
this central question. ‘This question does not assume that there 
will always be persistent performance differences between 
firms.’ Rather, it supposedly assumes that in some situations 
persistent performance differences will arise between firms and 
those differences cannot be explained by traditional economic 
models of the firm. According to these traditional models, these 
differences should be unusual and if they exist, are most likely 
the result of anti-competitive collusive or monopolistic 
activities. [1] Also, ‘although economic theory predicts that 
differences among rival firms will be eliminated over time by 
competition, empirical evidence in strategic management 
research has shown this is not to be the case’.[2] So, some 
frameworks and models from different views have been 
proposed over time by researchers for describing competition 
and such performance differences. 
First models of competition based on the industrial 
organization (IO) economics were neo-classic models in a 
range from monopoly to perfect competition. Rooted in 
industrial organization (IO) economics and based on Mason-
Bain approach, structure-conduct-performance (SCP) was 
proposed. SCP model states that a highly concentrated market 
structure, dominated by a few large firms, will give rise to little 
rivalry and excessive prices and profits. On the other hand, a 
structure consisting of many small firms will produce a high 
degree of rivalry and low prices and profits. The S-C-P model 
focuses on factors driving the intensity of rivalry; as such, this 
perspective has been very useful in understanding competition 
and competitive strategy. 
The IO perspective and research tradition provide direct 
insights to how firms can obtain competitive advantage (in 
terms of IO, market power) through positioning in the industry 
structure and therefore pursuing strategies appropriate to that 
structure. However, the IO literature has limitations in 
producing a comprehensive theory of competitive advantage 
and differential firm performance. That theory is in the form of 
a mathematical model with an equilibrium solution which is an 
important constraint. Also, the IO literature focused on the 
industry as a unit of analysis and has suffered from a lack of 
attention to internal organizational factors and a general failure 
to measure conduct directly in empirical studies. 
Whereas IO studies of the relationships between industry 
structure, conduct, and performance were intended to help 
develop public policies that promote competition, Michael 
Porter by taking a different point of reference pioneered the 
application of IO concepts to strategy formulation [1, 2].  More 
specifically, he viewed the SCP paradigm as giving managers a 
systematic model for assessing competition and developing 
profit-maximizing strategies. So he proposed a well-known 
Five – Forces model for finding attractive industries and the 
ways of positioning in those industries for gaining superior 
performance. Indeed, he tried to answer two questions: where 
to compete? and how to compete?  By disaggregating business-
unit profits into components capturing industry effects, 
corporate effects and market share effects, Porter following [3] 
contend the importance of industry effects on firm 
performance. But, by extending Schmalensee ‘s approach, [4, 
5, 6] reveal that business effects were twice as important for 
company performance as  effects of industry.  These results 
stimulated research interest  in  the  slightly  refined question: 
“Why do firms in the same industry perform differently?” In 
answer, this question, several frameworks, and theories have 
been proposed. One problem with Porter’s model and IO 
economics, in general, is that it tends to view industries as in 
equilibrium and competitive advantage as sustainable. 
However, in today’s fast-paced world, resting on the 
achievements of yesterday’s actions, even if they were 
successful, surely result in failure tomorrow. Today’s 
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competition needs dynamic actions, with perpetual updating 
and reevaluation of situation and strategy. 
From an internal point of view, the dominant framework in 
the strategy literature to address the question has been 
resource-based view (RBV) of the firm. ‘According to RBV, 
‘firms in the same industry perform differently because, even in 
equilibrium, firms differ in terms of resources and capabilities 
they control’ [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]  These  frameworks  have  one  
feature  in  common  that  is  not  suitable  for  fast-changing 
environment of today; they are all static and linear in nature. 
Hence, scholars started to propose more dynamic models and 
frameworks for strategy, competition, and subsequent 
differential firm performance.  Strategy scholars have started to 
acknowledge explicitly the importance of dynamic processes, 
including the acquisition, development, and maintenance of 
differential bundles of resources and capabilities over time [9, 
13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. This perspective called dynamics 
capabilities is an extension of the RBV of the firm. One of the 
criticisms of the traditional resource-based view is that it 
largely ignores the external environment.  Dynamic capabilities 
attempt to resolve  this  shortcoming: Teece [19] define 
dynamic capabilities as “the firm’s ability to integrate, build, 
and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address 
rapidly changing environments.”  This definition brings into 
play both the resource-based view and the notion of rapidly 
changing environments. 
Simultaneously, competitive dynamics that its root goes 
back to Austrian economics is another research stream which 
considered competition to be a dynamic market process rather 
than a static market condition. The concentration is on the 
process according which a market has moves toward or back 
from equilibrium; it is this movement and not the equilibrium , 
that was taken to be of interest. Competitive dynamics is the 
research area of interfirm competition according to special 
micro competitive acts and reactions, tactical and based on 
organizational contexts, and their forces and results. companies 
act and competitors have reactions, and these back and force 
determine existence and long-term performance. In contrast to 
Porter’s approach that unit of analysis is industry level, this 
stream of research has focused on micro and real competitive 
actions and reactions among competing firms. 
One more dynamic approach to dynamic competition has 
been evolutionary economics. Nelson and Winter [20] studied 
strategy, performance, and survival of companies over time 
using a variant of Darwin’s natural selection theory. In the 
short-term, firms may pursue targets rather than profit 
maximization, such as ‘‘satisficing’’ or striving for profits to be 
achieved above some acceptable level. However, any firm 
veering too far will be weeded out of the marketplace 
eventually.  Firms are cognizant of this harsh natural selection 
process and tend to learn over time how better to adapt. 
These streams of strategy research show that strategy 
scholars are interested in dynamic theories that depict the 
dynamic evolution of performance differences  among  
companies.  making  and  experimenting  theories  that  
describe longitudinal performance differences patterns among 
companies would be an enormous step forward where 
mainstream strategy approaches have struggled. As Porter 
stated below: “while there has been considerable progress in 
developing frameworks that explain differing  competitive  
success  at  any  given  point  in  time,  our  understanding  of  
the dynamic  processes  by  which  firms  perceive  and  
ultimately  attain  superior  market positions is far less 
developed” [21]. Ghemawat and Cassiman have pointed to the 
same problem as well. “The challenge of fully incorporating 
dynamics into how we think about strategy is a major one, 
perhaps the biggest one that the field faces going forward” 
[22]. 
In this research, by doing a literature review, we intend to 
show that models of competition in answering differential 
company performance in the field of strategic management 
have moved from static to more dynamic. From early days of 
research, strategic management has been a multidisciplinary 
field which has been borrowing heavily from economics, 
psychology, sociology, political science, evolutionary biology, 
systems science. But the main contribution originated from 
economics. In this paper, economics approaches as the main 
contributor are adopted as well.   We would find how each 
individual study has examined competition and strategy. Also, 
we would  represent what are commonalities in existing  
studies, what studies disagree about. We state that, because of 
the social and multidisciplinary  nature of strategy, it is 
neccessary  for scholars  to adopt several perspectives 
described by different theories for the progression of this field. 
II. THE HISTORICAL OF SCHOLAR THOUGHT  
A. Two classic competition models: Cournot and Bertrand 
In 1838,  Cournot  proposed  a model  for  competitive  
industries  in which  firms  make decisions by acting rationally, 
trying to maximize profits, and strategically, taking into 
account its competitors’ decisions at the time of making their 
own. In such model, economists assume that Industries are 
such that, due to entry barriers, there is little scope for new 
entrants to undermine the competitive structure of the industry. 
Therefore, by setting their output to maximize profits, the 
market will determine prices higher than the perfectly 
competitive equilibrium price, and under this condition firms 
will benefit in a sustained  manner.  Fifty  years  later  Joseph  
Bertrand  reviewed  Cournot’s  work  and proposed an 
extension to Cournot’s model where, instead of firms setting 
the quantities, they adjust the price of the goods produced. 
Bertrand pointed out that there was a shortcoming in Cournot’s 
argument: even though the solution holds in equilibrium, if one 
of the producers were to reduce their price by an infinitesimal 
amount, that producer would attract all buyers,  which  would 
then mean that the competitor  would have to reduce their price 
to below the competitor’s price, and so on leading to a ‘price 
spiral’ until the firms would be charging the cost of production. 
It is interesting that even though the  Bertrand  and  Cournot  
competition  models  have  very  similar  assumptions,  they 
produce vastly different outcomes: in the Cournot model, firms 
make profits, whereas, in the Bertrand model, firms do not. 
B. Industrial organization (IO) perspective 
The traditional  industrial organization  paradigm is one of 
the foundations  in strategic thinking and research. Let’s take a 
look at earliest strategy frameworks and find their connections  
with  IO.  One  of  the  earliest  proposed  frameworks  in  
strategy  field  is Learned, Christensen, Andrews, and Guth 
(LCAG) framework that has become the foundation of business 
policy [36]. This framework defined strategy as a means of 
how a firm attempts to compete in its environment with 
considering important choices of different internal and external 
aspects of the business. It also took into account macro  factors  
such political  and social  factors. Indeed  LCAG  suggested  
general  and logical tests in determining firm’s policies. In this 
framework, the successful firm was one that created and found 
a position in its industry which took into account internal and 
external factors. Since early business strategy literature after to 
LCAG was extensively translated fundamental paradigms of 
LCAG and extensions into a sequence of general analytical 
steps [37]. 
The essence of IO and subsequently proposed frameworks 
based on this paradigm (e.g., Bain/Mason)  is  that  a  
company’s  performance  in  the  market  depends  on  the 
structural characteristics  of the industry condition  in which it 
has competition. It means that industry structure determines the 
behavior/conduct (strategy) of firms and the collective conduct 
then determine the collective performance of the firms in the 
industry [38]. In this view, firms have dimensions such as 
allocation efficiency, technical efficiency, and innovativeness. 
Since the structure is the prior cause of conduct and conduct 
itself is the cause of performance, in this chain conduct could 
be neglected and consider industry structure directly in trying 
to explain performance. 
An essential branch of IO research is oligopoly theory; it’s 
the study of the consequence of competitive interactions in a 
market where firm’s actions affect its competitors [39]. This 
theory wanted to make clear the link between structure and 
inter-firm rivalry and provide difficulty determinants firms 
were facing in the market competition. It filled the gap of 
bipolar cases of pure competition and monopoly in the 
economist’s view. Also, one influential framework for the 
analysis of competitive interactions was born, “game theory” 
[40, 41]. Game theory found its place in IO as a section of 
oligopoly theory. Although these theories were so important in 
the strategic research  and suggested systematic  frameworks  
for assessing  competition  in an industry, they essentially 
attempt to focus on just one aspect of LCAG framework: 
external factors (opportunities and threats). 
IO  economic  paradigm  has  had the highest  impact  in  
forming  foundations  of strategic thinking and research, but 
strategy practitioners have been skeptical of IO. Porter [42] 
outlines some of the most important ones: Frames of reference 
are different between practitioners and IO perspective; former 
is interested in the issues of an individual and unique  
company,  latter  focus  on  industry  as  a  unit  of  analysis.  
Some  research  also explained that even in an industry firm 
perform differently. IO assumption was that all firms  in  an  
industry  are  identical.  Hence,  IO  was  not  able  to  bring an 
answer  for differential firm performance in the same industry. 
In addition, IO perspective was static. Although the static 
model is useful in the analysis of competition, most 
fundamental strategic issues for firms in the competition are 
not solely structure but structural changes (such as dynamics of 
concentration, entry barriers and so on). The main unanswered 
question in IO (Bain/Mason) perspective was “what are paths 
to such structure and what strategist can do about changes in 
this structure?” Moreover, traditional IO considered industry 
structure the sole determinant of firms conduct and 
performance. Thus firms are under the shadow of their 
industrial structures, and there is no room for change and 
innovation. But practical strategists, on the other hand, have 
realized that firms can change the structure of their industries 
through their actions. It was evident in the real world that there 
are often game changers that change the rules of industries. 
Furthermore, oligopoly theories were abstract, and most of the 
concepts were based on abstract experimental situations and 
not actual industries.  All in all, these shortcomings made 
business strategists uncomfortable about embracing IO. 
C. Theories of the firm 
Economic thought has had a deep influence on thinking in 
the field of strategy. In particular, theories of the firm bring a 
viewpoint for thinking about organizational objectives and a 
framework for analyzing important firm and competition 
research problems. The main question regarding firms in the 
theory of the firm is that if markets are the effective forms  of  
exchange  “why  firms  exist?”  and  also  “what  are  their 
boundaries  and  scope?”  Here, we demonstrate  the  
assumptions  underlying  of  several economic theories of the 
firm for tracing the background in competition and strategy 
research. 
C.1    Neo-classical perfect competition 
In this view firm exist to combine resources to produce a 
product; Firm is assumed like a black box with some inputs 
which its output is a joint product of multiple inputs. In this 
neo-classical model, two main inputs are labor and capital. 
Perfect competition generally assumes that optimum input can 
be confirmed, all parties in the competition have complete 
information and resources are completely mobile and divisible. 
In this model since firms assumed to be identical, the objective 
of each individual firm in maximizing profit yields the whole 
market to equilibrium and thus zero economic returns for each 
firm. 
C.2    Chicago tradition 
The implicit theory of the firm in this tradition is that firms 
exist to enhance efficiency in production and distribution. From 
the theory of the firm’s point of view in Chicago approach, 
when firms act together as a monopolist in the industry, their 
combined profits are maximized. However, Stigler [26] figures 
out that effective collusion requires costly control  and  
enforcement,  given  that  each  party  has  an  incentive  to  
chisel  on  the agreement. Because of these high costs, Chicago 
school of thought holds that effective collusion is not likely to 
persist. So observed large size and above-normal returns are 
due to the firm’s efficiency differential in production and 
distribution in comparison to competitors. Chicago perspective 
applies main concepts of neo-classical price theory – in 
particular   profit   maximizing   and   competition   –   while   
neglecting   other   central assumptions of perfect competition. 
One paramount role in this perspective is the entry of new 
competitors in imposing an imperative efficiency on incumbent 
firms and on determining long-run earnings potential. Although 
this view holds the efficiency based profits “need not be 
eliminated soon by competition” [27], in the long-term 
imitative entry will drive the firm’s profits to zero. 
C.3    Coase/Williamson transaction cost theory 
Ronald Coase was the pioneer in this view who notes firms 
and market are alternative methods for coordinating 
production. Hence, the question to be answered in realizing the 
existence of firms is the basis for choosing between 
alternatives. The core of Coase’s [28]  analysis  is  that  
operation  of  market  bring some cost, and  by  creating  an 
organization  and  permitting  some  authority  (an  
entrepreneur)  to  direct  the  resources, certain costs are 
preserved. In this view what is particularly important is the cost 
of negotiating contracts for inputs. Thus, firms exist to 
economize on the costs of conducting the same exchange 
between contractors. 
One framework in this approach called “market failures” 
framework [29] which is based on Coase’s work, challenges 
the traditional assumptions of the theory of the firm. From this 
perspective, the form of organization that develops in an 
exchange situation depends on the efficiency of that form for 
completing necessary transactions. This framework assumes 
decision-makers are opportunistic with bounded rationality. 
The fundamental characteristics of transactions between firms 
and consumers which impact how  exchange  process  will  be  
conducted  are  “asset  specificity,  uncertainty,  and frequency” 
[30, 31]. The most critical factor of these is asset specificity 
because investment in assets which are specific in a transaction 
make a commitment for both parties to the transaction for some 
period of time. When the productive assets are non- specific, a 
market contracting process is efficient. Thus this framework 
provides good insights about issues of firm existence and 
boundaries. Overall, this view considers the firm  as a  
governance  structure  which  is  crafted  to  economize  on  
transactions  costs. Economies of scope [32] work and the role 
of asset specificity in producing benefits from technological  
innovation [33] are important examples of how the 
combination of this view with strategic management can 
extend knowledge in both fields. 
C.4    A behavioral theory of the firm 
This view in analyzing firms rejects the assumption of 
rationality of “economic man.” The main focus of the 
behavioral theory of the firm is to predict price, output, and 
resource allocation decisions but with an clear focus on the 
actual process of organizational decision   making   [34].   One   
of   the   critics   of   traditional microeconomics view is Simon 
[35] who mentions the goal of an organization is not profit 
maximizing but ‘satisfying’ level of profits. He viewed 
organizations as a system of individuals with multiple goals 
who operate in a defined structure. Simultaneously, managerial 
decision making is limited because they cannot build 
comprehensive models of the world and   also   their   
information   processing   is limited:   hence   optimum 
(maximizing profit) is impossible since managers are 
characterized by “bounded rationality” when the encounter 
“uncertainty” and thus “behavioral rules” replace optimization. 
Overall, the fundamental difference between the behavioral 
theory of the firm and more classic theories is in the treatment 
of rationality and uncertainty. In the determination of prices, 
outputs and resource allocation, the decision-making process is 
adaptively rational, with multiple objective and organizational 
learning. 
D.    The Austrian school of thought 
Although traditional industrial organization economics has 
been one of the cornerstones of strategic thinking and research, 
many of its assumptions have come under widespread 
criticism. Some scholars have questioned the utility of IO 
concepts because of an inadequate theoretical foundation. IO 
largely neglects dynamical behavior and disequilibrium in the 
dynamic world of business. But there was another school of 
thought in economics that these characteristics were 
fundamental building blocks of it: “Austrian economics.” In 
this school, the emphasis is on “the dynamic market process” 
and “entrepreneurial discovery” which are critical concepts for 
strategy research. 
The concept of “the market process” tends to distinguish 
Austrian school. Unlike neo- classical theory that concentrates 
on equilibrium with the static snapshot of the nature of 
competition, Austrian economists view markets as processes of 
dynamic finding that move scattered information. They assume 
that earned profits of firms are through the entrepreneurial 
discovery. Austrian economists state that for the economy to 
land in equilibrium, innovations and discovery must be 
discontinuous (i.e., Its appearance is only in discontinuous 
clusters). They view innovation as a continuous process. 
Therefore, the market is never in equilibrium. Market  
inefficiencies   enable  a  market  not to be in  equilibrium   and  
are responsible for money making opportunities. From this 
perspective, the entrepreneur performs as an opportunity 
catcher or arbitrager. The entrepreneur sees an opportunity 
between what the resource market has to offer and what 
customers will be willing to pay. By taking advantage of this 
market inefficiencies, the entrepreneur receives the economic 
profits from the arbitrage. 
Indeed, their main focus is on entrepreneur inspired by the 
desire for above-normal returns, as a motive for promoting 
discovery and catching opportunities in a constantly changing  
(disequilibrium)  market.  So,  because  competitors  quickly  
imitate  known strategies to generate above-normal returns till 
their return premium vanishes, these above-normal  returns  
achieved  by  discovery  are  just  temporary.  This  means  that 
empirical modeling of business performance to find strategies 
(business laws and some sort of order)   that  firms  can  
execute  to  achieve  abnormal  profits  ‘will  be  largely 
unsuccessful. Thus, because the returns to a given strategy 
dissipate, firms must adapt and respond  to changing  
conditions’.[3] As  such,  flexibility  becomes  a critical  
strategic factor. 
Indeed, business success is based on time and firm-specific 
unobservable factors. This school sees profits not as the 
consequence of monopoly power but rather as the result and 
incentive for discovery and innovation. Under this perspective, 
the goal of strategy formulation  is  not  on  limiting  
competitive  forces  but  rather  on  the  entrepreneurial 
discovery. Gluck, Kaufman, and Walleck [43] ‘maintained that 
the essence of strategy is avoiding competition through an 
indirect approach’. 
Schumpeter discussed the critical roles of entrepreneur and 
innovation in business   success [44, 45].   He   contended   that   
economic   development   occurs   when   firms implement new 
products,  Production  processes,  and organizational  
techniques.  In his view,  the  entrepreneur  disrupts  the  
market  and  push  it toward  out-of-equilibrium. Innovations 
come into the market and innovator out-competes rivals and 
earn profits. These  abnormal  profits  provide  the incentive  
but are short-lived.  As innovations  are imitated, economic 
profits dissipate and eventually vanish. Market returns to 
equilibrium until another innovation takes place. This dynamic 
process which shows moves from equilibriums to dis-
equilibriums and vice versa is called “creative destruction.” 
The profits achieved by innovation give the firm a time 
window to pursue new innovations. Thus, the forces of 
dynamic competition destroy any firm that merely attempts to 
maintain status quo. The Schumpeter’s concept that sometimes 
market is in equilibrium distinguishes his perspective from 
Austrian mainstream. 
E.    Evolutionary economics 
Evolutionary  approaches  have had a long history  in 
economics,  but they have never shaped a formal position in the 
mainstream of economics. In part, this has been due to the 
diversity of evolutionary views in theorizing in range of 
individuals to aggregates. It is also an issue of what it means to 
say that a theory is "evolutionary" in the first place: is it make 
sense the use of analogies to central concepts from 
evolutionary biology, or is it something altogether different? 
And if so, what is the status of such analogies [10]? 
On a general level, the type of evolutionary theory that 
refers to the area of strategy brings analogies to the biological 
perspective of variation, inheritance, and selection. It tries to 
give a real-time entity of social and economic phenomena in 
terms of processes of change. Indeed, the process is an essential 
part of the evolutionary approach. Within this evolutionary  
view,  companies  have  initially  been  modeled  as  possessing  
path- dependent knowledge units (routines). The concept of 
routines give a rationale for the relative robustness that is 
essential for the successful utilization of selection issues. There 
has been little tendency toward  strategies that individual 
companies express on the basis of these knowledge 
fundamentals. 
Nelson  and  Winter criticized  IO because  of  its  lack  of  
attention  to  dynamic environment  brought  about  by  
technological  change [20].  The  profits  from  successful 
innovation are disequilibrium phenomena that come from lead 
times over competition. The equilibrium analysis of IO does 
not depict anything about innovation and entrepreneurship. 
Nelson stated that if dynamic, disequilibrium, and institutional  
complexity  are  notable  concepts  of  what  is  going  on,  then  
implications derived from the traditional theory must be viewed 
by suspicious [46]. But economically, the theory of Nelson and 
Winter is primarily, the same as its neoclassical counterpart, a 
theory of industries, with less focus on the company, due 
primarily to the importance it places on the selection 
environment. Indeed, ‘evolutionary theory in the management  
context  until  recently  has  dealt  with  understanding  the  
evolution  of industries’ [47]. 
In addition, there is a lack of attention in evolutionary view 
to firm behavior which is the suitable  level  that  analogies  to  
heredity  should  be  found.  Concepts  like  adaptation, 
learning, search, and path-dependence are mainly related to the 
level of the firm. Some number  of  attempts  has  been  made  
to  utilize  evolutionary  perspective  to  firm-level analysis. 
Some of these are depicted in the increase in publications 
regarding firm-level technology strategy from an evolutionary 
perspective. The increasing interest that Williamson's  version  
of  transaction  cost  theory  has  generated  among  
evolutionary theorists is further evidence. Finally, one should 
mention Richard Nelson's in which the perspective has become 
more firm-oriented [48]. The fact that industry-perspective 
remains dominant in the realm of evolutionary view is due to 
the narrow description of the firm and its resources. 
F.    Organizational ecology 
Until  now  we  reviewed the  economic  models broadly in  
analyzing  competition  and strategy. We also noted some 
advantages and disadvantages  of such models. One more 
perspective is called “organizational ecology.” This dynamic 
framework is interested in the evolution of a system of 
interacting companies, in particular, how the population of 
them changes over time. The use of organizational/population  
ecology models [47] in strategy and competition is a clear 
example that how techniques and models from other disciplines 
might be useful. 
In this perspective, based on the Darwinian concept of the 
“survival of the fittest” it proposes models that certain firms 
take positions that possess higher fitness than others in the 
population of firms. The premise here is that fittest firms will 
survive and others go out of business. The evolution of an 
industry can be modeled by considering how diverse types of 
firms  compete  over  time,  and how some  population  of firms 
survives longer  than others.  Behind  organizational  ecology  
is  the  notion  that  only  limited  resources  are available in a 
market. This approach goes beyond industry analysis and 
suggests that certain positions within an industry can still be 
attractive even when there are dominant incumbents. This 
perspective provides the opportunity for the analysis of smaller 
firms and also the fact that some firms may fail. 
Although  organizational  ecology tries to  consider  that  
firms  are of certain  types  and therefore assumes that there is 
heterogeneity among companies, this characteristic is not 
modeled explicitly. Moreover, there is a high level of 
formalization in this perspective where mathematical 
relationships between variables are modeled. Also, there is a 
problem of translation from natural science definition of 
genotypes to firms as constituents of the population. Another 
problem is the fitness optimization that can be viewed as an 
analogy of utility maximization from within economics, and as 
I noted earlier there are common problems   associated   with   
maximization   (e.g., “satisfaction”   proposed   by   Simon) 
approaches within management science. 
III. STRATEGIC MODELS AND FRAMEWORKS 
A. Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
At the heart of this view is this assumption that firm exists 
to hinder output through the monopoly power or collusive 
behavior with other firms. firms want to restrain output so that  
market  price  goes  up  and  therefore  successful  firm  will  
make a profit  from  the difference between this artificially high 
market price and its costs. From the economic point of view, 
these above-normal returns reflect the nefarious firm behavior 
that occurs at the expense of consumers. In this approach, a 
major focus has been empirical testing of “structure-conduct-
performance”  hypothesis  articulated  by  Bain  [23, 24, 25]. In  
this  hypothesis, structure of industry determines firm conduct 
(strategy) which in turn determines economic performance. 
Because firm conduct is supposed to be determined by industry 
structure,  conduct is often neglected, and the association 
between structure and performance has been examined. 
In  this  view  motivation  for  expansion  is increasing  
monopolization,  or  alternatively, preventing another firm from 
gaining monopoly control. Bain idea was that the notion of 
"perfect competition" ‘sets the standard for traditional 
industrial organization and provides the  foundation’  for  the  
premise  that  firms  earn  super-normal  returns  primarily  by 
exercising monopoly power [23]. But, a big departure from 
perfect competition view is that this view encompasses the 
richer concept  of firm heterogeneity;  although  perfect  
competition  predicts  that  there are no persistent performance 
differentials when the market is in equilibrium, Mason/Bain IO 
holds an opposite approach. The assumption is that persistent 
above-normal profits are based upon  long-lasting  although  
limited  types  of  heterogeneity  between  firms;  based  on 
different  studies  these heterogeneities  come in the forms  of 
dominance  in firm size, market share and collusion in and 
between industries. 
B.    Five forces framework and strategic groups 
After reviewing different types of economic formal 
frameworks and models, we focus now on more recently 
developed frameworks of competition and strategy. One of the 
most impactful contributions to the field of strategy and 
competitiveness  was the work  of Porter  [1, 2].  In Porter’s  
seminal  work which its roots go back to the industrial 
organization and in particular, Structure-Conduct- Product 
paradigm [49], the main task of a strategist is to find the answer 
for two questions: where to compete (which industry)? How to 
compete? (defendable position in that  industry).  Indeed,  
Porter  used  IO  concepts  but  from  the  frame  of  reference  
of a strategist.  Although  in IO the purpose  of economists  was 
how to grow  competition, Porter reversed the point of view of 
that purpose and proposed a model under which how managers 
and firms could limit competition for higher returns. His Five 
Forces model asserts that there are five determinants that 
ascertain the attractiveness of an industry. The Five Forces are 
as follows: the bargaining power of the firms supplying the 
industry; the bargaining power of buyers; the threat of new 
firms potentially entering the market; the threat of substitute 
products; and the intensity of competitive rivalry. 
In Porter’s view, strategy means “positioning.” Firms need 
to develop their strategies through a mixture of competitive 
dimensions, such as branding, pricing policy, higher product 
quality, better logistics, etc. these are enablers through which 
firms could gain an achievable and defendable position in an 
industry. This position enables the firm to gain above-average 
profits in the industry. Indeed, the meaning of strategy in this 
view is finding a defendable position that protects the firm’s 
competitive advantage from actions of five forces that shape 
competition in the industry. Perhaps due to the influential effect 
of Porte’s work in the 1980s, the basis of economics within 
strategy field has appeared to be unquestioned. In spite of 
strong features of this model, it has also been criticized because 
of its static nature. Hamel and Prahalad described this analysis 
as: “a snapshot of a moving car [50]. By itself, the photograph 
yields little information about the car’s speed or direction – 
whether the driver is out for a quiet Sunday drive or warming 
up for the Grand Prix.” 
In addition, Porter introduced the concept of strategic 
groups that followed the works of Hunt further developed by 
McGee and Thomas [2, 51]. In this concept firms that were in 
seemingly oligopolistic markets could be grouped into 
classifications. These firms remarkably follow similar 
strategies. Porter looked to the IO literature to give an 
explanation for this grouping of firms. In strategic groups 
framework firm are depicted on two-dimensional axes by their 
strategic attributes. One limitation of the strategic groups 
framework is that it considers the positioning of firms within 
this strategy space at one moment in time, and does not take 
into account the dynamics of the changes of position over time, 
changes that can be as a result of the reactions of one firm’s 
positioning affecting the subsequent positions of firms over 
time. 
C.    The resource-based view of the firm 
Another main attempt to explain differences between firms, 
their heterogeneity, came from the resource-based view of the 
firm. Scholars such as [12, 56] see resources as being the most 
important components of a firm.  Wernerfelt developed the 
notion of the resource-based view of the firm, building on the 
work of Penrose that perceived a firm as a bundle of resources 
[12].  The work of Penrose is considered a very fundamental 
and impactful one as a basis in this framework. Other notable 
contributions include [8, 9, 20, 32, 58, 59, 60]. Like early 
strategy scholars, these authors are primarily interested in 
differences across firms. What differentiates them is their use 
of economic reasoning, notably the economics of Ricardian and  
Paretian  rents.  In particular,  the  question  of why  some  
firms  earn supernormal profits has received careful 
consideration. While theoretical and empirical research in 
industrial organization economics has shown that a firm's 
profits are related to its choice of [3, 61], resource-based 
reasoning examines this question from the perspective of inter-
firm differences. 
The central assumption underlying resource-based theory is 
heterogeneity of resources. It means resource bundles and 
capabilities of production are heterogeneous among companies 
[56]. This concept implies that since resources are 
heterogeneously distributed among firms, and these resources 
are not in unlimited supply and are scarce, firms with superior 
resources will gain rents. It’s the known Ricardian rent. The 
crucial notion is that the supply  of “superior”  resources  
remains  limited.  So, efficient  firms  with  superior resources 
can sustain this competitive advantage just by their resources 
that can’t be developed freely or be imitated by competitors. 
What make distinction of monopoly profits from Ricardian 
ones is that monopoly profits is the outcome of restriction of 
output rather than an inherent scarcity of resource supply. 
In resource-based view, sustained competitive advantage 
needs the condition of heterogeneity be maintained. If it’s a 
short-lived phenomenon, profits will be ephemeral as well. 
Since firms are primarily looking for consistent and long-term 
rents, the condition of heterogeneity must be durable to add 
value. So there must be mechanisms which restrict competition  
for  those type of  rents.  Rumelt introduced  'isolating  
mechanisms'  ‘which protect individual firms from imitation 
and preserve their rent streams’ [59]. Another notion is causal 
ambiguity [58]. This means the uncertainty regarding the 
causes of efficiency differences among firms. There are very 
important contributions for isolating mechanisms and defying 
imitation in the literature including [9, 33, 49, 59, 62, 63, 64]. 
In spite of its considerable advancement, the resource-based  
view has  some number  of weaknesses. A case in point is that 
it’s often difficult to recognize which resource or combination 
of resources accounts for firm’s successful performance in the 
real world. This difficulty in assessment is likely due to the fact 
that it is impossible to measure them in isolation. As Porter 
noted, resources are valuable only if they "allow firms to 
perform activities that create advantages in particular markets" 
[21]. Another important contextual factor is the issue of 
resource complementarity. It means resources are contingent 
on other resources, so the system of resources is matter. 
Furthermore, the value of resources changes over time. 
In addition, resource-based view theory of the firm applies 
both process and equilibrium constructs, although 
inconsistencies between these are rarely acknowledged. Indeed 
resource-based  view  roots  go  back  to a neo-classical  theory  
which  is  clear  in  the equilibrium concept of sustainable 
competitive advantage [8]. On the other hand, many of the 
more practical contributions [65] deal explicitly with the 
process. So there is a need for further research regarding more 
precise definitions of resources and capabilities and also 
solving the conflict between dual concepts of equilibrium and 
process taken in this theory. 
D.    Delta framework 
It is evident in the literature of strategy that Porter’s 
industry analysis and the resource-based view (RBV) of the 
firm have had the highest impact and attention. From these 
perspectives, firms should either find an attractive industry and 
position accordingly or excel on unique resources and 
capabilities. Although these frameworks have often been 
considered conflicting rather complementary, Hax and Wilde 
focused on the complementarity  of views and propose a model 
called “Delta”( Delta is a Greek letter means transformation 
and change) [90]. But they contend that one missing piece in 
both of these frameworks is the “customer.” Hax and Wilde 
mention that “If you take Porter literally, the customer is 
represented by the “Buyer” – one of the Five Forces – whose  
bargaining  power  we  should  resist  or diminish [90].  In  that  
respect,  the  customer constitutes  an  additional  element  of  
the  rivalry  that  we  need  to  overcome.  In  the Resource-
Based View of the Firm, there is no explicit mention of the 
customer.” They assert that in the internet era, linking customer 
and enterprise through using network technology creates new 
sources of strategic options. Hax and Wilde contend that their 
Delta model is integrative of two main prior frameworks in 
strategy [90]. They say: “ Porter’s framework and the 
Resource-Based View differ in explaining the sources of 
profitability. Porter associates it with monopolistic rent that 
flows from industry structure. The Resource-Based View of the 
firm ties it to the corporation’s internal capabilities. They share 
the perspective that business is akin to war and that designing 
business strategy is akin to playing a zero-sum game. 
Profitability accrues to those who are superior to their 
competitors. The Delta Model takes issue with this almost 
obsessive focus on competition.” It is also clear that at the heart 
of Delta model is a customer. They explain it this way: “We 
believe that a firm owes itself to its customers. They are the 
ultimate repository of all the firm’s activities. At the heart of 
management  and, certainly, at the heart of strategy, besides the 
customer. We have to serve the customer in a distinctive way if 
we expect to enjoy superior performance. The name of the 
game is to attract, to satisfy, and to retain the customer.” They 
put the “customer bonding” concept at the center of strategy 
formulation. According to their view, they propose three 
strategic options for firms: “system-lock in” under which  firms  
make proprietary  platforms  that lock-out  other competitors,  
“total customer solutions” that based upon firms reduce 
customer costs or increase their profits, “best product” which 
options are low-cost or differentiation. Finally, they suggest 
their winning formula as follows [90]: 
• “Concentrate on the customer. Start with a careful 
segmentation of your customer base and develop as 
much knowledge as possible of the customer 
economics. Remember that the primary objective is to 
seek customer bonding. 
• Select the most appropriate strategic positioning 
among the three key options – Best Product, Total 
Customer Solutions, and System Lock-In – that will 
result in a customer value proposition with the highest 
possible bonding. 
• Define  the strategic  agenda  that determines  the 
action  program  to implement  your desired strategic 
option. Assure the proper alignment with the three 
adaptive processes – Operational Effectiveness, 
Customer Targeting, and Innovation. 
• Design the proper metrics and rewards to facilitate the 
strategy development.” 
E.    Game theory and co-opetition 
The concept of rational decision makers who can make 
decisions that maximize their utility is the basis of game 
theory. Game theory is about understanding  reactions of 
competitors to your actions. If we think from the competitor’s 
point of view, we are able to make decisions that are better than 
when we think in isolation as a stand-alone player. The 
application of game theory in strategy and management has 
been widespread [52] whereby more than one player interacts 
with other players by playing certain strategies; outcomes of 
plays are depicted in “payoff” matrices. The crucial aspect of 
the game theory is that your payoff depends on the strategies of 
your competitors. There are central assumptions in game 
theory: the competitor will behave rationally and will try to 
win; the competitor is independent in relation to other 
competitors; competitors are aware of the interdependencies 
and the actions that competitors could do. To benefit from 
game theory, strategists need to put themselves in the position 
of their competitors; they need to take an informed view on the 
likely competitor actions and choose the best course of action. 
Also, Brandenburger and Nalebuff applied the concept of game 
theory to business under the name of ‘Co-opetition’ [53].  They 
simultaneously considered competitors in an industry 
competitor and cooperator. They assert that if the firm is seen 
of this view, this may benefit all firms in the industry. 
Game theory created high expectations in the field of 
strategy as an analytical tool for analyzing the dynamics of 
interaction between firms. But, this early promise has not 
entirely come into reality with strategy work. There are several 
reasons for this issue. First, in order to make game theory 
models relevant, the firms under consideration should be the 
same size. Second, there are only a limited number of strategies 
that firms can play. Third, the focus is on the equilibrium 
outcome, although contemporary game theory research on 
repeated games addresses this problem [54]. However,  these  
recent  developments  largely  have  been  in  economics  world  
and  not strategy field. In Porter’s paper ‘Towards a Dynamic 
Theory of Strategy’ [21], he mentions that although game 
theory may be seen as dynamic, in that there is a sequence of 
actions made by firms, this is not a dynamic theory: ’by 
concentrating sequentially on small numbers of variables, the 
models fail to capture the simultaneous choices over many 
variables that characterize most industries. The models force 
homogeneity of strategies. Yet it is the trade-offs and 
interactions involved in configuring the entire set of activities 
in the value chain that define distinct competitive positions. 
Finally, the models hold fixed many variables that we know are 
changing.’ 
Moreover,  most  of game  theory  models  rest  on  the  
assumption  that  the  players  are perfectly rational: it means 
the predictability of competitor’s actions and thus playing 
optimal strategies. In addition, much of the research in game 
theory is used to determine Nash equilibrium: where no one 
player has an incentive to deviate from their equilibrium 
strategy. However, it should be asked whether such 
assumptions can provide a suitable methodology for analyzing 
problems in the real world of business or for the competitive 
system which often is not in equilibrium. 
F.    Dynamic Capabilities 
One of the criticisms to resource-based view of the firm is 
that it neglects the external environment. Also, the notion that 
the distribution of resources remains stable over time does not 
provide a realistic notion of interfirm competition in high 
turbulence times when the resources that may have been the 
source of competitive advantage in the past may now  not  be  
of  use.  Moreover,  there  is  much  confusing  terminology,  
sometimes conflicting,  within  the area of resource-based  
view of the firm.  
Indeed,  Teece in their key work on dynamic capabilities 
goes so far as to say ‘we do not like the term ‘‘resource’’ and 
believe it is misleading’ [19]. So scholars extended the 
resource-based view of the firm and proposed the notion of 
dynamic capabilities. The same as resource-based view, 
terminology definition in dynamic capabilities is also difficult. 
Dosi describes the ‘terminological anarchy’  of  the  resource-
based  view:   ‘the  term ‘‘capabilities’’ floats in the literature 
like an iceberg in a foggy Arctic sea, one iceberg among many, 
not easily recognized as different from several icebergs nearby’ 
[66]. Makadok uses the rather obvious definition of resources: 
‘organizationally embedded non- transferable firm-specific 
resource whose purpose is to improve the productivity of the 
other resources possessed by the firm’ [67]. Teece defines 
dynamic capabilities as ‘the firm’s ability to integrate, build, 
and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address 
rapidly changing environments’ [19].  This definition considers 
both the resource-based  view and the notion of rapidly 
changing environments. Teece asserts that ‘capabilities cannot 
easily be bought; they must be built.’ Although resources can 
be ‘picked’ in order to bring them within the firm, capabilities 
are  different:  they  are  built  not  acquired  –  capabilities  are  
embedded  within  the organization whereas resources are not. 
Winter distinguishes between ‘ordinary’ organizational 
capabilities and dynamic capabilities [68]. Putting his 
definition on his earlier work with Nelson [20], organizational 
capabilities are defined as a ‘high-level routine (or collection of 
routines) that, together with its implementing input flows, 
confers upon an organization’s management a set of decision 
options for producing significant outputs of a particular type’, 
basing the concept on routines: ‘behavior that is learned, highly 
patterned, repetitious, or quasi-repetitious, founded in part in 
tacit knowledge – and the specificity of  objectives’.  What  
makes  dynamic  from  ordinary  capabilities  is  that  dynamic 
capabilities are concerned with change and learning. The 
concept is that dynamic capabilities determine change rate of 
organizational capabilities. 
Eisenhardt and Martin contend that dynamic capabilities are 
of several types: firms may use dynamic capabilities to create, 
integrate, recombine, and release resources from the firm [57]. 
They also distinguish between dynamics capabilities in ‘high 
velocity’ and stable  markets  situations:  in high-velocity 
environments,  dynamic  capabilities  are experiential  (i.e., not 
analytic),  iterative (i.e., non-linear),  and are inherently  simple 
in nature. In markets that are moderately dynamic, they suggest 
that dynamic capabilities become   efficient   and   robust   
routines   become   embedded   in  cumulative,   existing 
knowledge within the firm. In other words, effective dynamic 
capabilities enable a firm to adapt to a changing and turbulent 
environment. They assert that although dynamic capabilities 
are idiosyncratic, ‘they exhibit commonalities or ‘best practice’ 
across firms. Their broad structural patterns vary with market 
dynamism,  ranging from the robust, grooved routines in 
moderately dynamic markets to fragile semi-structured ones in 
high- velocity ones. They evolve via well-known learning 
mechanisms.’ They finally conclude that lies in resource 
configurations, not dynamic capabilities. Teece suggests that 
‘Further theoretical and organizational  work is needed to 
tighten the framework, empirical research is critical to helping 
us understand how firms get to be good, how they sometimes 
stay that way, why and how they improve, and why they 
sometimes decline’ [19]. 
G.    Hyper-competition and Environmental Turbulence 
The turbulent competitive environment is precisely the 
opposite of stable landscape. In such industries, the roles of 
different competitors are blurred. They rely on more complex 
and diverse combination of competitive dimensions at the time 
of designing their competitive strategies.  This makes 
prediction  rather difficult,  and in some conditions  misleading. 
These landscapes require new ways of thinking about 
competition and industry dynamics. The dynamic capabilities 
approach mentioned earlier has been an attempt to respond to 
the challenges posed by the turbulent competitive environment. 
As we saw in [19] seminal definition of dynamic capabilities, 
firms may have to deal with rapidly changing environments. 
This concept has been used by diverse words: turbulence, high-
velocity environments, and hypercompetitive environments 
[69]. 
D’Aveni depicts the notion of ‘hyper-competition’ – a state 
that is defined as: ‘[resulting] from the dynamics of strategic 
maneuvering among global and innovative combatants [69, 
70]. It is a condition of rapidly escalating competition based on 
price- quality positioning, competition to create know-how and 
establish a first-mover advantage, competition  to  protect  or  
invade  established a product  or  geographic  markets,  and 
competition based on deep pockets and the creation of even 
deeper pocketed alliances the frequency, boldness, and 
aggressiveness of dynamic movement by the players accelerate 
to create a condition  of constant disequilibrium  and change, in 
other words; environments escalate toward higher and higher 
levels of uncertainty, dynamism, heterogeneity of the players, 
and hostility’. 
D’Aveni assumes  that  there  is  a  new  type  of  
competition  –  ‘hyper-competition,’ completely different from 
the traditional notion: ‘in the old days of stable environments,  
companies  created  fairly  rigid  strategies  designed  to  fit  the  
long-term conditions of the environment’ [69]. D’Aveni’s idea 
is that competitive equilibrium was in the past where “less 
dominant firms accepted their secondary status because they 
were given the opportunity to survive by a leading firm that 
avoided competing too aggressively.” One  major  reason  to  
focus  on  turbulent  environments  has  been  the  static  nature  
of strategy and competition frameworks but dynamic nature of 
the environment. Teece asserts that  existing  models  for  
analyzing  strategy  have  not  proved  useful  at understanding 
sources of competitive advantage in times of rapid change [19]. 
If we observe that  the  business  environment  in the real  
world  is  dynamic  and  complicated,  it’s  not reasonable to 
consider  models  developed  under  concepts  of  equilibrium,  
stability, and linearity. 
Hence,  several  scholars  suggested  different  concepts  for 
making  strategy  in a turbulent environment. Hamel and 
Prahalad propose the concept of “strategic intent” for guiding 
strategy [50]. According to their idea, strategic intent is the 
overall direction of a company that captures the essence of 
winning, is stable over time, and sets a goal that deserves 
personal effort and commitment. This thought brings to mind a 
stable and systematic pattern that take the company toward a 
valuable and determined target. Bourgeois  and  Eisenhardt  
suggest  the  “imitation”  strategy  for  surviving  in the 
turbulent environment [71]. In this strategy, follower goes 
towards the position of leader. Brown and Eisenhardt assert 
that such movement should be made incrementally [72]. Rivkin 
suggests the imitation of complex strategies [73]. He applies 
NK model in his analysis and assumes that there is 
interconnectedness between strategies. Overall, these studies 
show that the ability of rapid and continuous change is a crucial 
capability in high- velocity markets.  
IV. LIMITATIONS OF CLASSICAL ECONOMIC-BASED 
APPROACH 
The formalization of economic models is actually based on 
explicit nature of model that brings a certain amount of rigor to 
the formulation process. However, there are important 
limitations when the economic view is used, particularly in the 
way that equilibrium is an assumption of this framework. Also, 
when firms in an industry are supposed to be homogenous, and 
the emphasis is on stasis. These limitations are significant in 
using this framework in strategic management. It’s crystal clear 
that most industries are not in an idealized form of equilibrium 
and the notion of how to deal with “turbulent” and maybe 
“hyper-competitive” environments is an active area of research. 
Economic  models  introduced  earlier  essentially  assume  
equilibrium  outcomes.  This thought that competitors finally 
will settle down into a stasis can only be applicable in an 
idealized competition where there is nothing more than pushing 
and knocking out competing firm out of equilibrium. One of 
the core tenets of neo-classical economics also is assumed in 
many models, “rationality.” According to this assumption 
actors (such as firms) will behave in a way that maximizes their 
utility under the given constraints. But, actors in the real world 
such as strategists do not always behave rationally - they may 
follow  ‘boundedly  rational’  behavior  [35],  and  not  
optimize  their  utility functions.  Simons contends that firms 
follow to get a level of “satisfaction”  in their objectives and 
don’t necessarily maximize their utility. Indeed, Porter himself 
[21] notes: “it is well known that [industrial organization] 
models are highly sensitive to the assumptions underlying them 
and to the concept of equilibrium that is employed.” Moreover, 
while game theory was seen as a potential field for modeling 
dynamics of strategy and competition, the involving of more 
than two firms into the market poses additional problems. One 
firm among many of firms may move and perturb the entire 
competitive system. 
In  addition,  economic  models  suppose  that  the  world  
jumps  immediately  to  an equilibrium. But one main point that 
is not considered is the path to equilibrium. Also, this  
equilibrium  assumption  means  there  are  not  any  space  for  
innovation  and  no incentive for firms to change strategies. It 
seems these models are considered to exist in isolation, where 
there are no environmental shocks, or indeed external 
environment does not  have  any  effect  on  the  system  for  
pushing  it  out  of  equilibrium.  Knott introduces the problem: 
‘the goal of the strategy is persistent profits – in short, to 
overcome the  microeconomic   equilibrium   of  homogeneous   
firms   with   zero  profits’ [55].   More specifically, this 
equilibrium is rather the equilibrium of the model than we 
observe in the real world. 
One more problem in using the microeconomic approach in 
modeling strategy issues is its over-emphasis on the 
homogeneity of firms. This assumption eliminates the 
possibility of analyzing the impact of differences between firms 
on their performance in an industry. More recent theoretical 
approaches in formulating competition and strategy such as 
resource-based view (RBV) of the firm [8, 56] and the dynamic 
capabilities approach [19, 57] are specifically focused on 
realizing how intrafirm heterogeneity leads to differences in 
firm’s strategies and performance.  
V.    COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS WORKAROUND 
The research  stream  of competitive  dynamics  which its 
intellectual  roots go back to Schumpeter’s concept of creative 
destruction has progressed in recent years in the mainstream 
literature of research on strategy and competition. The focus of 
this view is on dynamic processes by which firms act upon and 
react to one another in the pursuit of market   opportunities.   
Firms  act  and  competitors   respond,   and  these  interactions 
determine  survival  and  long-term  performance.  ‘Similarly,  
the  Austrian  school  of economics [74, 75, 76] considered 
competition to be a dynamic market process rather than a static 
market condition.’ The core is the process by which market 
moves. It’s this movement and not an equilibrium that is taken 
to be of interest. Also based on this school of thought, since the 
market is in disequilibrium advantage is a limited temporal 
window for exploitation, so it is transient [77, 78]. 
According to definitions, the competitive dynamic is the 
study of inter-firm hard competition based on specific 
“competitive actions and reactions,” their strategic and 
organizational context, and their motives and outcomes [79, 
80]. The intent of this perspective has been mainly to address 
more fine-grained questions regarding competition: how do 
firms act and rivals react when they compete? Why some firms 
compete in a particular way? How do competitive interactions 
influence performance and vice versa [81, 82]? 
In the field of strategic management, seminal works of 
MacMillan & Von and Bettis & Weeks’s used this frame of 
reference [83, 84]. They were the beginning of competitive 
dynamics research in the realm of strategy. Other works 
followed these earlier studies. The main premise of this stream 
of research is that it can provide a useful integrative framework 
for strategy by bridging micro-actor and macro- competitive 
viewpoints. Chen outlined five research themes in this field 
[85]: “(1) competitive interaction:  action-level studies; (2)  
strategic  competitive  behavior  and repertoire: business-level 
studies; (3) multimarket and multi-business competition: 
corporate-level   studies;   (4)   integrative   competitor   
analysis;   and   (5)   competitive perception. “ There are also 
some studies in integrating competitive dynamics and RBV 
frameworks [86, 87, 88]. However, there are several gaps in 
this stream of research that one of the most important for 
example is integrating micro and macro perspectives [89]. 
VI.    TOWARD THE ECONOMICS OF COMPLEXITY 
We have reviewed several models from different 
perspectives in earlier sections. What is clear is that most of 
them are based on paradigms of equilibrium, linearity, 
rationality, optimization,   etc.   We   may   need   more   
systematic   views   which   are   based   on disequilibrium, 
nonlinearity, behavioral rules, networked interaction and so 
forth. One promising area that might address such phenomena 
in the analysis of competition and strategy is complexity 
science, and in particular, the economics of complexity. 
Complexity  has arisen  as a new unifying  and systematic  
theory to understand  the nature of commonalities and change 
across a variety of disciplines ranging from mathematics,  
physics,  biology,  economics,  social  science,  etc.  complexity  
takes  a systemic approach under which nonlinear interactions 
among agents (constituents of system) in micro level will result 
in macro and emergent behaviors that cannot be realized  just  
by  studying  agents.  Complexity  builds  on  some  
assumption: 
Heterogeneous agents; means agents are intrinsically 
heterogeneous by character. Local information means 
knowledge of agents is local and no one can have the 
information of the  whole  system.  Non-linearity;  interactions  
among  agents  are non-linear  in  nature. Systemic 
interdependence; result of the behavior of individual agent is  
dependent on the chain of communications in the system. 
Phase transition; small changes in the parameters of the system 
change the behavior and outcomes as the system goes from 
changing its phase. Non-ergodicity; means a little trigger at a 
particular point in time impacts the long-term dynamics  of a  
system.  Emergent  properties;  properties  of a  system  that  
arise  at the aggregate level; simply put, means whole is greater 
than some of the parts. A core aspect of complexity is how 
interacting agents produce system-level patterns that those 
agents in turn react to. This leads to the emergence of aggregate 
properties and structures that are not observable at lower levels. 
There is a review of complexity theory applications to 
economics in [91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96].  It has been  asserted that  
complexity  is very frequent  in economic issues [97]. Based on 
equilibrium concept and reductionist approach in classical 
economics, aggregation is simply the sum of parts. It means 
dynamics of a system is the only simple sum of the dynamic of 
constituent parts. This view clearly does not consider 
interdependencies  and  positive/negative  feedbacks  in  the  
interaction  of  parts.  What classical  models  fail  to realize  is 
correct  view toward  aggregation  where the concept  of 
“emergence” enters the scene. Schelling notion [98] of 
emergence means the spontaneous formation of self-organized 
patterns at different levels of a hierarchy [99]. Simon explain a 
complex system in this form: “Roughly, by a complex system I 
mean one made up of a large number of parts that interact in a 
non- simple way [100]. In such systems, the whole is more than 
the sum of the parts, not in an ultimate metaphysical sense, but 
in the important pragmatic sense that, given the properties of 
the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial 
matter to infer the properties of the whole. In the face of 
complexity, an in-principle reductionist may be at the same 
time a pragmatic holist.” 
From the perspective of complexity, ABM (agent-based 
modeling) can be used as a bridge between micro and macro. 
In ABM models aggregate outcomes (the whole, e.g., the 
differential firm performance) are estimated as the sum of 
individual characteristics (its parts, e.g., firm’s size). However, 
system-level behavior is often distinguishable from the 
behavior of agents which make up the whole, resulting to the 
discovery of emergent properties [101, 102]. In this view, the 
whole is greater than the sum of parts. Also, it might happen in 
a way that seems system follow a distinct  logic,  with its 
objectives  and means. ABM provides  a technique  that allows 
systematic analysis of dynamics and emergent properties at the 
macroscopic level. The ABM methodology introduced by 
complexity stream of research uses bottom-up approach and is  
focused  on  the  interaction  of  many  heterogeneous  agents,  
which  may  produce  a statistical equilibrium. [94, 95, 103, 
104, 105]. ABM allows making models with heterogeneous   
(e.g.   heterogeneous   firm  in   competition)   agents   based   
on   simple behavioral rules and interactions (e.g. competitive 
behaviors) between them, where the resulting systemic and 
macro dynamics and empirical regularities (e.g., statistical 
equilibrium,  maybe we can call it, differential firm 
performance)  are not known and deductible from  behavior  of  
agents [106].  This system doesn’t always need to be in 
equilibrium (assumption of most economic models) and based 
on interactions could change its phase and goes from one 
equilibrium to another. What is surprising in this perspective is 
that it has both views of IO and Austrian schools in itself.  It is 
dynamic  processes  (Austrian)  that give rise to emergent  
(e.g., creative destruction) properties, and simultaneously 
system can sometimes be in equilibrium (IO view). So I assert 
that these prior perspectives in modeling competition are not 
contradictory, but each one of them only points to one aspect of 
the problem. Complexity perspective and in particular ABM 
provides the significant potential to model and understand the 
dynamics of competition and strategy. Identification of the 
advantages of such approach has been highlighted in social 
science has been highlighted in the literature as well [107, 108, 
109].   
VII.    COMPARISION OF STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 
      From a historical review of different perspective regarding 
strategy and competition it’s explicitly evident that most of 
proposed models and theories are derived from three economic 
approaches: industrial organization economics, Austrian 
economics, and evolutionary economics. In this regard, 
existing perspectives and tools available in the economics of 
complexity can bring value to the research field of strategic 
management. In addition, as shown in table I, important 
models of strategy in the realm of strategic management 
research evolved from static to more dynamic approaches. 
Therefore, it reveals that deriving perspectives from system 
theories and science of complexity and complex systems can 
add to the toolbox of strategy scholars and they can dig deeper 
in realizing dynamics processes and behaviors that create out-
of-equilibrium conditions.  
VIII.    CONCLUSION 
There are many frameworks and models of competition and 
strategy that have made significant steps towards unifying and 
integrating different aspects of competition. While most of 
them are based on economic paradigms and models, some of 
them adopted views from other fields of science such as 
sociology, systems science, psychology, biology, etc. after  
reviewing  different  frameworks  of  competitive  behaviors  
and  strategy  in  the literature we contend that models have 
used different perspectives and frames of reference in response 
to the differential firm performance within and across 
industries, but all of them are trying to answer the original issue 
in strategy realm. There exist both commonalities and 
contradictions among proposed frameworks. Most of them are 
based on economic theories of the firm, but some applications 
from other fields of study are evident. Fundamental issues such 
as rationality, unit of analysis, used research methods, 
equilibrium, level of aggregation and dynamics require further 
research in the field. But one thing is evident from the 
evolution of strategy frameworks that models proposed 
intended to be more dynamic. For further research, we suggest 
scholars pay attention to different frameworks systematically 
and attempt to unify and integrate these fragmented 
perspectives. Strategy researchers must approach 
interdisciplinary  research with rigor, with a firm grounding 
and understanding of the relevant theories and techniques from 
other fields which they seek to integrate with strategy. Because 
the final goal of the strategy is to find a systematic  and 
dynamic  theory  which  can consider  different  features  of 
competition and strategy in a unified model (consider internal 
and external), and also could  explain  differential  firm  
performance  and  competitive  advantage.  Although because 
of complex and dynamic business idiosyncrasies in time and 
space, such natural laws of strategy may not be guaranteed. We 
can be hopeful to find some patterns on macro levels that are 
useful. 
 
TABLE I.  MODELS OF STRATEGY WITHIN STATIC TO MORE DYNAMIC APPROACHES 
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